Transition to Democracy for Iran — Part III
Conditions for Regime Change
Uprisings vs. Movements vs. Social-Political Revolutions
The first question we are faced with is, when can a regime change occur? Before that a short background for processes of political change is in order.
Many Iranians mistakenly assume that a violent revolution is the only solution.
Many also mistakenly consider the WLF uprising as a revolution.
Uprising: What happened in Iran after Mahsa Amini’s killing was a popular uprising, not a revolution, not even a real political movement. The main difference between an uprising and a movement is in the objectives. An uprising happens, when the population is so extremely dissatisfied with the state of affairs that it openly shows its discontent and voices its grievances. An uprising is generally not organized and has no leadership. The different groups that participate each have their own demands (no well-defined objectives) and these demands might change with time (no persistent objectives). Because of this, an uprising will not lead to a meaningful or significant positive change, unless it becomes a movement.
Social Movement: We would have a movement only if the dissent would have a clear and persistent demand over a longer period of time (at least one year). For example, the “white Wednesdays” that was started by Mrs. Masih Alinejhad was an actual social movement. The demand was clear: not forcing women to wear headscarves. This demand has remained persistently the same over nearly ten years. The WLF uprising has neither a clear demand, nor the various demands have remained unchanged over the past year.
Political Movement: The shortcoming of the white Wednesdays movement is that it is a purely social movement. A social movement aims to change something in society to solve a social issue but it does not necessarily try to change a law. E.g. a movement in Germany for achieving equality for women, does not need to be political. It does not have the aim to change the law, because German law already demands equality of women and men. Changing the law is strictly political work. Discrimination against women in Iran is systematic, it is the literal word of the law, it is demanded by the law. This means that a purely social movement will not achieve equality because it won’t change the constitution. To change the constitution we need a political movement. A political movement would require a clear and persistent demand for changing a specific law (e.g. abolishing the headscarf law in Iran). Without a leadership structure, it is not possible to develop a political movement with a clear cause and the necessary tools to achieve change.
Social-Political Revolution: A single movement in principle aims to achieve a narrow and specific change. A single political movement or a few of them would eventually change some laws in Iran and make life perhaps a bit better for Iranian women, but that would be the extent of it. They would not fundamentally change the regime to provide more freedoms for everyone or alleviate the immense economic suffering of over 40 million Iranians. Fundamentally changing the structure of a regime in order to drastically change the political landscape (more freedoms, human rights, real democracy, etc.) would require a social-political revolution. This would be the result of a large number of different political and social movements, who use their synergies and work in principle for the same cause and in accordance with the same general leadership. This is why a consolidated leadership developed by a Parliament in Exile is such an effective solution. Of course, we want one such revolution without violence. That is not only possible, as both theory and practice show clearly, it is even desirable. More than half of violent revolutions in the past 50 years have lead to a worse situation than before (including the 1979 revolution in Iran).
Regimes like Iran and Saudi Arabia systematically discriminate against women, as everyone knows. Western governments use this fact to make larger demands in political or economic terms in their dealings. This was the reason the West promoted the female representatives of this popular uprising (e.g. Mrs. Alinejhad and Mrs. Boniadi), despite knowing that currently no Iranian group possesses the capacity to actually lead a real process for regime change.
There are other reasons for not using the word revolution without clarification:
Up until around the 1980s, revolutions were not studied properly. Historically, revolutions have usually been associated with violence. Most people hence consider a revolution as the result of a long, hard and bloody battle. When a modern person thinks about the potential outcomes of such a process, the question becomes “who is the most likely to win a long, hard and bloody battle?”. Often, two scenarios are foreseeable. Either a great, wise, enlightened leader exists, who leads a people patriotic or enlightened enough to side with him / her (the US revolution), or the most aggressive, i.e. the strongest, wins. Given then experience of the past 50 years, especially in west Asia, the latter option is seen as more probable by most people. And hence, the average citizen tends to avoid a revolution, which is a logical choice.
On the other hand, what has been generally considered and called „revolutionary“ in the modern western world (since 1900) has been generally associated with Marxist movements, not just in the West but everywhere. The 1979 revolution in Iran was also heavily influenced by Marxist ideologies. This is why the political establishments of Western countries rather not support what could potentially become another Marxist revolution. For this reason, we must use the term social-political revolution to clearly distinguish between the two.
Conditions for Regime Change
Decades of research on social movements, reforms and revolutions show that in principle two approaches exist for a transition to democracy. The first is when the conditions for regime change are fulfilled completely and this forces a regime change against the will of the rulers (e.g. French Revolution, the US independence, Iran’s 1979 revolution, etc.) — this process is often accompanied by widespread violence. The second is that the existing elite (of the dictatorship regime) see more benefit in slowly giving up control and power in order to retain some of the resources and influence they currently have (the UK,, South Africa, South Sudan, Indonesia, etc.).
Our view is that these two approaches are the sides of the same coin. The fulfillment of the economic and social conditions for regime change provide a long-term basis for rational choice among the existing elite. They would rather avoid the risk of a full-fledged (and often violent) revolution, in which they are certain to lose not only all their power and riches, but also their lives. This is especially true for Iran, because the current elite are the ones who violently obliterated the elites of the previous regime. When the conditions for regime change are present and a sudden and potentially violent regime change is a realistic threat, the elite would enter negotiations with the opposition for a transfer of power.
Our goal should be to ensure that the conditions for regime change in Iran become reality. There are seven conditions in two different categories.
The first category includes five „necessary conditions“ that need to be met so that the process of regime change can even get started.
The second category includes two „sufficient conditions“. If these two conditions are realized, then regime change becomes extremely probable.
A) The Necessary Conditions
Crisis of legitimacy and disillusionment: Different studies and surveys show that the IR regime has lost its holiness and legitimacy. Iranians have realized that religion cannot answer the questions regarding economy or politics. The integrity of the regime is also strongly in doubt. This has lead to the disillusionment of the majority of the population, who see the regime as incapable of ruling properly. The regime has failed in every major aspect (ideology, economy, society, infrastructure, religion, foreign policy, etc.), which has even alienated its once loyal adherents. Some polls show that fewer than 20% of Iranians consider the absolute rule of the supreme leader as acceptable and fewer than 35% identify themselves as Shia Muslim.
Shifting of the dominant ideological discourse: For four decades, the IR regime has used brainwashing, advertisement, cooperation with influencers, economic and social tools and coercion to enforce and uphold its ideology, which says that the supreme leader has absolute power over all political decisions. Even if many did not agree with this, the Shia ideology was the dominant political discourse in Iran just until a few years ago. But the fading of the legitimacy and holiness of the regime also means that the effectiveness of its ideology has also strongly weakened. Today more than half of Iranians reject the idea of supreme leader and demand democratic participation in political decision making.
Serious economic peril: Lack of expertise, enmity with science and advancement, monopolistic control over resources, severe corruption and incompetence have all lead to a weak economy, mostly reliant on oil export. The Trump administration cut the main source of foreign currency from the oil export. Even by smuggling cheap oil to China, Malaysia and South Korea, the IR regime cannot cover its inability to solve social and economic problems by using the oil rent at the moment. Extreme poverty among 25% of Iranians and increasing fuel prices, extreme loss of currency value and high inflation are proof of that.
International Isolation: The IR regime’s involvement in the Syrian civil war used up 20 billion USD from Iran’s currency reserves, but made the regime hated in the region. For decades, the West has also adopted a hard stance, especially since Trump’s presidency. China’s general stance to avoid direct clashes with the US and to stay away from military conflicts and it wouldn’t involve itself with the regime’s internal problems. And even Russia has no solid intention or ability to keep the IR in power, should a regime change become a real possibility.
Split and Dispute among Elites: The responsibility of Ali Khamenei has become clear as the main culprit in the economic and international defeat of Iran. And because he is at the center of this issue, the elite have started to distance themselves from him to avoid taking damage or being held responsible (now or in future). Different groups of elites who see their dominance on political and economic power in danger because of extremist actions by Khamenei, are not willing to fully support him and his entourage. For example, the self-claimed but failed traditional reformists (the camp of Khatami and Moussavi) have come to the conclusion that a new constitution is needed. The number of elites representing this view is increasing steadily.
B) The Sufficient Conditions
1.Opposition Leadership and Collective Action: The first important condition for turning the potential of regime change into reality, is the emergence of an opposition leadership. This leadership can be one person, several persons, a political group, a party, a coalition of groups, an alliance or a congress. What is important, is that this leadership.
a. proves to be a trustworthy alternative to the current regime. This means that the opposition should be able to immediately take over the political power and ensure the continuation of social and security services (water, food, electricity, police, etc.).
b. provides a cause as a clear goal for the different social and political movements to align with it.
Collective action is the heart of any social change. It provides not only a shared cause, but also a sense of unity and justification. Well established methods exist for stimulating collective action among the dissent, but every effective method for organizing large scale opposition groups requires an efficient leadership. When the leadership becomes known and trusted by different groups in the society, especially unions and movements, this can lead to large numbers of people from different groups working together for the cause provided by the leadership.
On the other hand, the existence of a leadership takes effect only when the people collectively act based on its goals and methods. This means that developing an effective leadership requires considering the demands and inputs of different social groups and political movements. Hence, the opposition leadership should not simply take some famous grievance (like mandatory headscarf) and try to make that into a platform. It should go much deeper and identify significant problems and their root causes. It should then provide detailed and clear plans on how it wants to counter this problem and change the laws that have caused it. This is why the solution of a Parliament in Exile is currently the best practicable solution for the emergence of an opposition leader for Iran.
2. Neutralizing the armed forces: The armed forces of the IR regime are trained, paid, organized and legally protected. They have overwhelming advantages in terms of weapons, tactics, strategy and resources, and so far as the power dynamics stay the same, they will have no reason or interest to change their behavior. Clearly, so long as the armed forces of a totalitarian regime are able and willing to suppress dissent and protest, there is little hope of a non-violent regime change. Studies show that especially oil-rentier dictatorships like the IR regime can use their armed forces successfully to immobilize protests and subdue popular uprisings using an immense income source that is independent of tax or work by most of the population (petrochemicals). Totalitarian regimes like the IR retreat from their position and accept to yield some power to the opposition, only if there is a realistic and immediate threat of organized and high level disobedience or revolt by the armed forces. As the main armed defense system of the regime, so long as IRGC continues to fully support the regime, dissolving the regime without using violence will not be possible. But if the opposition succeeds in dealing with the IRGC, then the regime will feel threatened and will accept to start negotiations for transferring power to opposition groups.
Khomeini’s Solution for Collective Action: Khomeini knew that most Iranians were culturally religious. Iranians had some core religious beliefs even though they weren’t too serious about the details. One of these core beliefs was the concept of heaven. He argued that Iranians should rise against the Pahlavi regime, violently if needed. Should the revolutionary person kill anyone for this cause, they are doing so for god and will go to heaven. Should they get killed, they have died for god and will go to heaven. Ultimately heaven justifies all revolutionary actions and the person goes to heaven. There is no losing. The best case scenario was living to see the revolution succeed and enjoy the fruits of victory. The worst case scenario was going to heaven before the revolution succeeded. This system was kept even after the revolution and was used to encourage young men to go to the war fronts.
The problem of „Free Riding“: We know that the leadership has to win the trust of 3.5 million people and provide them with a cause. But there is a social problem that can hinder the success of the leadership. The leadership in exile should devise detailed plans for combating this issue. This issue is known as free riding. A logical individual would consider extreme revolutionary acts as too risky and not worth trying, especially if he / she is alone. If the revolution succeeds, he / she will enjoy the perks of change anyway. So, most individuals, who could risk losing their lives or freedom or possessions, prefer to wait out the troubling times in the hope of a better future. Or they get involved only if they have some protection. With the memory of the Islamic revolution that produced the current regime, this is a major reason for many Iranians being hesitant about starting a new revolution. This issue can be mostly solved, if the matter of collective action is solved. But it will also require accurate planning for avoiding violent actions or reactions from the regime. The leadership in exile should always search for the methods that can be realized with the lowest possible human cost. If the leadership asks for reckless behavior that would endanger the lives or livelihood of people, of course they would not find such a leadership attractive.
The other articles of this collection:
1. Institutional Democracy for Developing Iran
2. The Structure of the IR Regime
6. The Missing Link — A Consolidated Leadership
7. Developing Leadership through a Parliament in Exile
9. The Roots of Laws in Modern Societies
Select References
Pouya Alimagham (2020), Contesting the Iranian Revolution, LINK
Erica Chenoweth (2019), Physics of Dissent and the Effects of Movement Momentum, READ HERE
Michael Stohl (2017), States and Peoples in Conflict, LINK
James Defronzo (2014), Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, LINK
Kevan Harris (2017), A Social Revolution, LINK
Jack Goldstone (2016), Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, LINK
Daniel Ritter (2015), The Iron Cage of Liberalism, LINK
James Denardo (2014), Power in Numbers, LINK