Transition to Democracy for Iran — Part VI
Consolidated Leadership
Effective leadership and the methods for its development depend strongly on the case and context. There also exist quite a number of substantially different approaches and schools of thought in this field. Here we describe some general backgrounds that are relevant to the struggle against the IR regime. Currently, the opposition to the IR regime is fragmented and lacks a unified structure, which makes it difficult to coordinate and execute effective actions and hence we miss all the opportunities that become available (e.g. large-scale protests like the WLF uprising). Also, Iranians have not only been subjected to decades of propaganda and disinformation by the regime, but have also never had access to free political parties, whose most important function is the political education of the population. No free political parties, regulated and limited political education in schools, tightly controlled political academies and suppression of freedom of press have meant over the decades that the 'political culture' among Iranians is extremely low. Activists and most members of social and political groups are not exceptions.
Well established methods exist for stimulating collective action among the dissent but every effective method for organizing large scale opposition groups requires an efficient leadership. Such a leadership must be active, open, transparent, honest and responsive. It should be able to identify the most pressing problems Iranians have, understand them accurately, propose functional solutions for these issues and try to implement some of these solutions, even from exile. When the leadership becomes known and trusted by different groups in the society, especially unions and movements, this can lead to large numbers of people from different groups working together based on the guidelines provided by the leadership. This will lead to collective action among Iranians.
Some empirical studies suggest that in some regions of the world even a mere 4% of a society’s population is sufficient to achieve a major social-political change. That would mean perhaps that if 3.5 million Iranians across the country demonstrate and strike in a coordinated and consistent way, they could win against the regime. The current situation in Iran and the IR regime’s strong grip on most significant economic, financial and cultural institutions though means that this might not be sufficient for Iran. The IRGC is able to mobilize militia members not just in Iran but also in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, who would fight for it and do so with brutal violence.
The opposition should consider the need to mobilize a significantly larger number of people, while at the same time working on more efficient tactics (e.g. a complete strike of the transportation sector). Of course, to mobilize even "just" 3.5 million people, a cause is needed. A cause provided by a competent leadership that is seen as a trustworthy alternative. To be trusted by the actively opposed groups is not sufficient. The so-called 'silent majority' should also be motivated to join the dissent or at least not hinder them. This social group currently considers regime change as too improbable and hence too risky. To persuade them, the opposition leadership should show that it can
immediately take control of the system,
avoid chaos, looting or armed unrest,
ensure the continuation of important utilities and facilities like water, power and fuel,
have command over the military forces to avoid coup d’états and foreign invasions,
ensure that a dictator will not arise, but that the opposition groups will remain committed to the values it had promised (human rights, democracy),
establish a fair and functional interim government for the transition group until fair and free elections are held.
The Phoenix Project (among others) has attempted to develop a so-called '100 day plan' for the immediate period after regime change. But this plan, like the others similar to it, are not only not particularly realistic (they assume to have complete and unhindered access to all centers of power without any resistence or complication e.g. from armed forces), but are also not based on the most advanced scientific approaches (e.g. the plan for reducing the risk of inflation is simply insufficient). More importantly, there is no suggested strategy, how to achieve the regime change, nor how political power will be shared by the groups and organizations, which are to win against the regime.
The opposition leadership should not just take some famous grievance (like mandatory headscarf or inflation) and try to make that into a platform. But rather it should go much deeper and identify significant problems, for example proving that laws cannot be based on Islam, no matter which laws. It should then provide detailed and clear plans on how it wants to counter this regime and change the named laws. What would it do, who would do it, how long would it take and what results are expected. In short, the leadership should develop a winning strategy with a roadmap and communicate it clearly.
Characteristics of the Consolidated Leadership
Leadership structures will vary depending on the strategies that opposition groups employ depending on the specific context in which they operate. However, we can use the existing experience from many political movements all around the world and also the wealth of knowledge from decades of research to describe the characteristics of a functional consolidated leadership, which then outline the general method for developing leadership. The two most important mid-term tasks are:
Developing and publishing detailed strategies for regime change and the transition period as a proof that it is an alternative to the current regime. The socio-economic plans of the opposition leadership should be so attractive as to convince millions of Iranian (including some current followers of the IR regime) that they will have a better quality of life if this opposition leadership takes over the political system.
Providing a clear cause for the dissent inside Iran to facilitate collective action among them and finding a solution for dealing with the armed forces. Only if the armed forces accept not to use violence against protesters, is there any real hope of non-violent regime change. If the advantage of a regime change outweighs supporting a corrupt, immoral and unstable regime, they will change sides. But convincing the armed forces that a regime change is beneficial to them is not a simple task.
In order to move in that direction, the immediate next steps of the opposition leadership are:
Establishing a clear set of goals, priorities and agreeing on a minimum shared vision for the future and identifying concrete steps to bring about a positive change.
Establishing channels of communication between different opposition groups.
Identifying key figures who can provide a unifying vision and direction. The Mahsa Charter from ADF Iran can be seen as a step in this direction.
Developing strategies for building support and mobilizing public opinion (e.g. by engaging in protests or civil disobedience, the media and influential actors, etc.).
Building trust through demonstrating a commitment to human rights, democratic values and principles, engaging with the Iranian people on a regular basis.
Establishing a clear chain of command and decision-making structure, which will enable the leadership to respond quickly and effectively to any challenges or opportunities that arise.
Legitimacy of the Opposition Leadership
One of the favorite arguments of the regime in recent years has been the claim that “without us (the IR regime), Iran would end up in a civil war like Syria”. One of the reasons this argument influences people untrained in politics, is that the opposition of the regime has so far not provided a clear-cut, realistic and practical plan for their actions or methods, either for a transition to democracy or for ruling after regime change. As far as we can see, none of the opposition leaders has provided full details of some political-economic study, models for solutions or realistic descriptions of the social, economic or political systems or mechanisms that should replace the current ones.
The result is that no real plan seems to exist, how to achieve a positive change, how the transition phase would seem like and what the next regime will be. Due to this, the opposition has earned no widespread credit or political legitimacy. This ineffectiveness in proving to be a trustworthy alternative to the regime is the reason why the opposition groups have no major popular basis in Iran.
As a concrete example, consider a student in the middle of Tehran. She probably doesn’t farm her own food. She probably doesn’t even know where the nearest farm is. She relies on the supply chain system working to bring foodstuff to grocery stores near her. In order to buy food, she needs to pay money, be it cash or digitally using a card. Either way, she relies on the banking system to work. When she has the food, she relies on electricity to store the food in a refrigerator and on water to wash and cook the food. If the systems and networks that enable these services were to be disrupted or stopped, an average citizen wouldn’t be able to live normally and healthily for even a week. A mass exodus of 12 million citizens from Tehran in search of food can also not be a realistic solution.
What this means is that average citizens would only then support an opposition group actively, if its leadership can prove and guarantee that all the important services will continue, should the regime fall. The opposition leadership must be able to ensure that banks won’t be looted, police will keep order, electricity and water will run, fuel will be available, etc. To be able to guarantee this, the opposition leadership must exhibit the ability to take control of the relevant functions that manage the infrastructures, energy and other resources. This requires expertise, experience and competences. So far, no opposition group has shown to have such skills available. This can be changed when these groups start working in a parliamentary system.
Current Issues hindering Consolidated Leadership
As it is clear, these important and major steps for forming a consolidated leadership all share the classic and famous „revolutionary“ character that most people know from other examples of regime change. It should be said though, that none of these steps happen spontaneously or on their own. We should not wait for a large uprising like WLF to take place in Iran to start developing leadership. In order to properly take these steps, concerted efforts should be carried out by the main opposition groups to move in this direction. Especially holding public debates by different groups on the problems that the dissent face is an essential tool for forming leadership. It helps achieve the minimum shared vision.
In the first months after the WLF uprising started, a large number of activists mistakenly claimed that „lack of a central leadership is an important strength of this movement“. This claim is not only false, it is also dangerous for the WLF uprising. Without a consolidated leadership, none of the important goals of the opposition groups can be achieved. Also noteworthy is that although these actions are the typical „revolutionary“ actions, there is no need for them to be carried out in any „revolutionary“ fashion. Well planned, well organized and well managed actions towards bringing the different opposition groups together will be much more effective than forced actions taken due to „necessities“ or „shared enemies“.
In the end, the only real way to achieve legitimacy and hence become a viable alternative for the current regime, is to be trusted and supported by the general public but also normal bureaucrats, police officers and soldiers.
The other articles of this collection:
1. Institutional Democracy for Developing Iran
2. The Structure of the IR Regime
3. Conditions for Regime Change
7. Developing Leadership through a Parliament in Exile
9. The Roots of Laws in Modern Societies
References
Niccolo Machiavelli (1532), The Prince, READ HERE
John Kotter (2001), What Leaders Really Do, READ HERE
Ronald Heifetz (2001), The Work of Leadership, READ HERE
Paola Rivetti (2020), Political Participation in Iran from Khatami to the Green Movement, LINK
Peter Northouse (2018), Leadership: Theory and Practice, LINK
James Hunt (2013), Leadership as Symbolic Management (Chapter), LINK
James MacGregor Burns (2012), Leadership, LINK
Doris Kearns Goodwin (2006), Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln, LINK
Robert Greene (2000), The 48 Laws of Power, LINK
Ronald Heifetz (1998), Leadership Without Easy Answers, LINK
Bernard Bass (1998), Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact, LINK
Jay Conger (1988), The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership, LINK
Joseph Rost (1991), Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, LINK
Phoenix Coordinating Board (2024), First 100 Days Emergency Management & Response Plan, LINK