Transition to Democracy for Iran — Part VII
The Parliament in Exile as Consolidated Leadership
After more than two years since the WLF uprising started, it seems that the situation has been hampered. Lack of inclusive political organization and leadership, and the necessary financial support has led to the erosion of forces and the quenching of the flames of the uprising, just as it did in 2019. Hundreds have been killed and many families deprived of their assets. It is time that the senior members of all the different opposition groups realize the importance of a consolidated leadership and start working towards it.
A winning strategy can lead to forced structural reforms with the ultimate goal of dissolving the current regime and establishing a democracy at the lowest possible human and social cost. In order to be able to develop this strategy, first a consolidated leadership needs to be established. The best method known to us for solving the problem of shared leadership is forming a type of Government in Exile, which will initially consist of a Democratic Iranian Parliament in Exile.
The main steps of the suggested process, which Kavian is currently advocating for, are:
Establishing a Democratic Iranian Parliament in Exile (PiE) in order to create a collective and consolidated political leadership,
Integrating and aligning various social and political movements with the political leadership of the opposition.
Using modern technology, e.g. block-chain, voting for the PiE can be organized over the internet and under the supervision of international organizations (e.g. Amnesty). The PiE should choose well-known figures as its spokespersons, e.g. Mrs. Shirin Ebadi. In this case, it is likely that popular personalities enter this parliament and lead the commissions and take over the various parliamentary factions.
The general idea is to provide an alternative to the regime’s official parliament (Majles). Majles is not a true representative of Iranians and does not provide a meaningful platform for dissent or even debate. A PiE will be a platform for opposition leaders to work together to develop policies and strategies for achieving a democratic change in Iran. It can also serve as a symbol of the opposition’s commitment to democratic principles and provide a source of inspiration. Achieving legitimacy and mobilizing support among the population must be done through voting and engagement. In order to establish a democracy, we must use democratic tools.
It would be naïve to think that the regime would simply accept structural reforms, but consider the situation in which the PiE has gained such a popular basis that it could organize nationwide strikes and protests of hundreds of thousands of people in cities around Iran as well as abroad. In this case, the leadership of the opposition could increase the cost of not accepting these structural reforms for the regime and political elite so much that the government would have no choice but to submit to these demands. If the regime refused to accept the changes demanded, it would become more likely for it to be overthrown in a rupture method (e.g. by a revolution led by the opposition) and risk not only losing the resources they have illegally amassed but also their lives. It is quite unlikely that the cowardly elite of the IR regime would risk a rupture rather than accept structural reforms.
What is a parliament?
The Iranian Majles was originally planned as a method to have a few men represent a geological region of Iran. A real parliament is different in two important aspects.
In a parliament, the representatives who share similar political, social or economic views, work together, independent of geology, religion or ethnicity. For example, if there is a liberal democrat from Kordestan and one from Khorasan, they work together to develop a social-economic system based on liberal democracy.
Different political, economic leanings are weighted based on the number of voters. In Iran’s original Majles, every state of Iran usd to get a few representatives, so that each state had an equal voice. In a parliament, where the political programs play the main role, people in each state can choose between e.g. a liberal democrat, a green party member, a nationalist and a socialist. Three out of these will come to the parliament, and independent of their geological location, they will work with other representatives from the same political leaning. So, all the 20 green party members chosen into the parliament will work together for better environmental protection.
In a parliament, every group can have its own views and coexist. None of them has to give up any of their ideals. It doesn’t matter which group, direction, leaning or view a politician or a political activist has. As long as they receive enough votes, they can enter the parliament and represent their voters. For the PiE that should be constructed, any group that claims to be able to do better than IR for Iran should participate. And if they get more votes, then they will have a louder voice and a higher chance of doing what they intend. And if they get fewer votes, it becomes clear that most Iranians don’t find that political agenda interesting.
The Goals and Functions of a Parliament in Exile
What is the goal of a political group or party that is in power? Its goal is to maximize its time in power (in a democratic system this would be to serve the country based on their political agenda, in a non-democratic system this would be in order to achieve as much power and resources as possible). What is the goal of the opposition? To minimize the time it is away from power. The IR regime and its elites like to maximize their time in power. The regime undertakes certain actions (including enforcing ideologies, stealing oil money, etc.) to stay in power with the support of the elite. What should the opposition be doing? They should be trying to minimize their time away from political power in Iran. The best way to do that is by proving that they can establish a better government for Iran than the IR has. They think they have been “opposing” the regime, but in reality, they have been very inefficient and unconvincing. This problem can be solved within a PiE, where the opposition of the IR regime can prove itself as a better alternative to the current system.
A Parliament in Exile as a political tool will serve five main goals:
Developing polity (a political society): Through regular debates, broadcasted publicly and then evaluated by voters.
Developing a winning strategy as described in the previous chapter. The strategy will lead to a roadmap for dissolving the regime.
Having a mandate for representing Iranians in the international community by being voted.
Obtaining resources be it money, expertise or human power.
Developing a plan for dealing with the armed forces.
By working on these tasks, the PiE will also be able to
make a strong case for receiving international support by demonstrating that it has broad popular support in Iran,
identify the problems many Iranians face in their daily lives, no matter the subject (environment, inflation, women’s rights, mandatory military service, heavy sanctions, lack of drinking water, military cooperation with Russia, etc.).
prioritize each problem and analyze the most important ones (lack of drinking water is an immense problem, it should be on top of the list).
provide alternative solutions and plans of actions for the important problems.
The PiE should focus in the long-term on influencing elections in Iran. Why is it that the candidates for Majles have to go through a filter set by the Council of Guardians? The PiE attacks this and demands change. The IR regime will resist. A comprehensive and intelligent plan to abolish this approbative supervision will be developed and the campaign would continue until the approbative supervision of parliamentary and presidential elections in Iran would be abolished. The campaign would need a large array of actions, civil disobedience, demonstrations, strikes, sanctions, etc. that ultimately would force structural reforms on the regime. While keeping violence and bloodshed to the absolute minimum, the PiE will increase the pressure on the IR regime. At some point there will be a snap:
The IR regime agrees to reform that law: from then on, elections for Majles will remain unfiltered by Mullahs and the oil mafia, the real representatives of Iranians will enter the Majles and start working for the people instead of the oil mafia. That will inevitably bring other changes.
The IR won’t accept reform, this would lead to a lot of cost and damage to the regime and eventually a form of rupture, which they certainly would like to avoid. This rupture will either result in a forceful regime change or at least a huge shift in power dynamics in favor of the PiE.
The IR regime (any regime) will prefer the first option. The way would then be open for many larger structural reforms. Because the collective leadership of the PiE could take a majority in the elections without the approbative supervision of Majles, it could initiate real structural reforms, including transparency of public sector revenues and expenditures, oversight of organs under the supreme leader, etc.. This is how England achieved a democracy without a revolution: step by step reduction of the power of the monarch in favor of transparency and control by the parliament.
Finally, there will be time for a referendum on the soul of the regime: not just the supreme leader, but the very legitimacy of the regime. With sufficient pressure, the regime will have no other option but to accept a UN-monitored referendum in Iran, which will lead to its dissolution and replacement by the interim government, which will consist of the government in exile (the members of which come from the PiE and Iranian groups), true representatives of Iranian people, who were able to get enough votes and enter Majles and political prisoners, who will be freed after the regime change.
An Initial Plan for Financing: Releasing Bonds of Revolution
A critical issue that the opposition must address is financing its campaign. The Iranian regime has significant financial resources and the opposition must find ways to raise funds to support its efforts. These resources would cover
a wide range of contributions to the dissent and their families,
compensation for those affected by street encounters,
daily costs of workers, who strike and lose their income,
supporting activists inside and outside of Iran,
the work of the PiE and its conferences,
establishing a professional information network for connecting with groups inside Iran (e.g. via Starlink),
establishing a broadcasting corporation or radio & TV network, etc.
Typical strategies for financing political campaigns are well documented in the literature. These methods can be effective if done properly. But here we propose a novel plan that can have a tremendous impact in a short time: a plan to finance Iran’s turquoise social-political revolution through releases of bonds.
These bonds of participation can be purchased by Iranians, public institutions, and natural and legal persons interested in democracy. The receipt of these papers can be conditional on the victory of the revolution and the establishment of the elected government of the people in the country within 5 years. The bonds can be repaid by the interim government. If we assume that the bonds would have $50 and $100 face values, publishing and selling 20 mio. of each can provide $3 bn. to Iran’s Parliament in Exile. With proper leadership, this sum is fully sufficient for the victory of Iran’s Turquoise Revolution. The only condition for the success of this plan will be the people’s trust in the PiE and the leadership of the opposition, which can be achieved if the political figures and leaders cooperate on this issue.
The other articles of this collection:
1. Institutional Democracy for Developing Iran
2. The Structure of the IR Regime
3. Conditions for Regime Change
6. The Missing Link — A Consolidated Leadership
9. The Roots of Laws in Modern Societies
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